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(b) The effect on Japan. It seems at least possible that if a licence granted to (say) the .B.K. for a Transaction specifically approved by the competent Japanese authority, is rendered valueless because Nemazee (who appears to be an essential link in the transaction) cannot be authorised to supply the opium, the Japanese Government may regard the refusal to issue licences toNemazee as a dodge to get round the
understanding arrived at at Geneva, i.e., as a
measure directed against them, and may take offence
accordingly. The result might be another outburst of
indignation, which it would seem desirable to avoid.
There seem to be two possible courses:-
To tell Hong Kong that Nemazee may be licenced
to take part in transactions involving the supply of
opium in circumstances which would be regarded as
justifying the transhipment of consignments at Hong
Kong; or
E. To agree with the Home Office and uphold
theGovernor's view that no licence should ever be
granted to Nemazee. In this case it would seem
desirable to suggest that Foreign Office should explain
confidentially th Tokio that licences under the Hong
Kong 1923 and 24 Opium Ordinances can only be issued
to "firms of known probity and good standing" and
that in view of Nemazee's known connections with the
illicit Trade, his firm is not regarded as suitable
to be licenced by the Hong Kong Government to trade
in opium.
Of these alternatives A. would appear to be
the more just course to adopt, since Nemazee cannot
be convicted of any offence; but, inasmuch as it would
be a weakening in the anti-Nemazee Campaign (we have
in fact at the instigation of the Home Office even
gone so far as to urge the Governor to take advantage
of
of every power he possesses, to make the Colony too uncomfortable for Memazee) it would certainly be strongly resisted by the Home Office and probably
aslo by the Foreign Office.
(Intld) J.J.P.,
14/2/25.
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